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Complex Incremental Product Innovation in Established Service 
Firms: A Micro Institutional Perspective 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Many product innovation studies have described key determinants that should lead to 
successful incremental product innovation. Despite numerous studies suggesting how 
incremental product innovation should be successfully undertaken, many firms still struggle 
with this type of innovation. In this paper, we use an institutional perspective to investigate 
why established firms in the financial services industry struggle with their complex 
incremental product innovation efforts. We argue that although the impact of micro 
institutional forces is often overlooked in innovation studies, these forces matter for 
innovation success. Our study complements the existing innovation literature and provides an 
additional explanation why incremental product innovation is highly complex and suffers 
from several liabilities in established firms. Using qualitative data from the Dutch financial 
services sector collected over the period 1997-2002, the paper illustrates how micro 
institutional forces at the business unit level affect complex incremental product innovation 
and how the interaction of these forces delivers their impact.  
 
Key Descriptors: Complex incremental product innovation, neo-institutional theory, micro 
institutional forces, financial services sector. 
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Complex Incremental Product Innovation in Established Service 
Firms: A Micro Institutional Perspective 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Developing new products and services on a regular basis is one of the key activities 
for many organizations. New products are a means to gain market share and ensure the 
viability of companies. They have been referred to as the crucial sources for competitive 
advantage (Tushman et al. 1997). This is also the case for incremental product innovations. 
Incremental product innovations are not radically different from the current product portfolio, 
but are often refinements and extensions of existing products of a company and seem to 
involve primarily exploitation-oriented activities (cf. March 1991). Incremental product 
innovation is, therefore, a critically important competitive factor in established industries 
(Banbury and Mitchell 1995) and focuses on leveraging a firm’s existing resources and 
capabilities (Henderson and Clark 1990; Leonard 1998).  
Incremental product innovation is typically implemented within the organization 
using existing organizational arrangements. Nonetheless, empirical evidence suggests that 
many firms seem to struggle with this type of innovation, which often results in diminished 
company performance, and lengthened development times (Banbury and Mitchell 1995; Song 
and Montoya-Weiss 1998). Past research on product innovation in both manufacturing and 
service industries has focused on key determinants that lead to successful product innovation. 
This large body of literature has examined the development process, what models could 
support the development process, and what key factors separate winners from losers (Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt 1986; Cooper 1984, 1999; Cooper et al. 1994, 2002). Additionally, 
important organizational issues such as working with and listening to lead users (Von Hippel 
1986; Leonard 1998); involvement and cooperation of multiple functions during the 
development process (Moenaert and Souder 1990; Dougherty 1992); use of flexible 
organizational structures and cross-functional teams (Souder 1987; Thwaites 1992; Volberda, 
1996) and a close fit between the firms’ strategy and resources (Crawford 1994) have all been 
cited as contributing to the success of incremental product innovation. 
Despite the value of these studies, the problems firms are confronted with when 
engaging in this type of innovation seem persistent (e.g. Adams et al. 1998; Tidd and Bodley 
2002). We do not suggest that firms never successfully develop new products. On the 
contrary, there are many examples of firms that successfully develop new products. Often 
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such projects are managed as ‘mindful deviations’, exciting enough to gain support, but they 
do not deviate from current practices to create illegitimacy (Garud and Karnøe 2001). We 
suggest that intraorganizational institutional forces have a strong impact on organizations (cf. 
Elsbach 2002), which may cause some parts of the organizational system to struggle more 
with incremental product innovation than others. Pfeffer and Sutton (2000) argued that 
divisions develop their own institutional norms and rules. The identification with such 
institutional norms and rules at the level of divisions or business-units can lead to the use of 
distinct organizational practices. This may imply significant differences in performance 
across organizational units. 
In this paper we take an institutional perspective to illustrate how intraorganizational 
institutional forces affect the development and implementation of incremental product 
innovation. We focus specifically on institutional forces at business-unit level and 
demonstrate how such micro-level forces may lead to the development of distinctive practices 
regarding innovative behavior within the same firm. We acknowledge that institutional forces 
at other levels (organization or field) may also affect the development and implementation of 
new products, yet these are beyond the scope of our study. 
  
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Institutional theory has developed prominently within the field of organizational 
analysis and is often viewed as a break from rational-actor models (see Zucker 1991; Scott 
1987). Conforming to institutional rules may even conflict with organizational efficiency 
criteria (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Institutionalized organizational behavior is seen as being 
based on ideas, values, norms, and beliefs embedded in the institutional environment. Oliver 
(1992) speaks of a ‘force of habit’ that alongside an organization’s history and tradition 
creates a certain degree of value congruence among its members. Institutions guide individual 
actions in a specific direction due to the predefined patterns of which the institution is 
constructed and therefore constrain and enable individual behavior. The concept of 
legitimacy has been a focal point of study in institutional theory and refers to the degree of 
cultural support that an organization receives when adhering to demands and expectations 
from the institutional environment. Organizations incorporating legitimated elements 
maximize social acceptance and increase their capabilities for survival (Meyer and Rowan 
1977). In other words, for something to be considered legitimate it has to conform to 
accepted rules, procedures, expectations and frames of reference at the next highest level. 
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This means that employees’ actions should be legitimate at the firm level, whereas firms 
acquire their legitimacy from the field and societal level (Holm 1995).  
In line with Greenwood and Hinings (1996), this paper assumes that important 
institutional drivers or inhibitors of innovation can be found within organizations. 
Intraorganizational or micro-level institutional forces may provide strong explanations for the 
continued struggle of incumbent firms with incremental product innovation. Following Scott 
(2001), three types of institutional forces are distinguished: regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive.  
 
Micro regulative forces  
Organizational structures and procedures are among the most frequently studied institutional 
elements (Scott 1987). Many formal authority structures have defined clearly specified 
procedures to be followed, as well as associating penalties in the case of failure (March et al. 
2000). In his case study in Canadian mining, Wicks (2001) clearly portrayed organizational 
structures as ‘organizationally-imposed’ rules controlling the behavior of employees. Elsbach 
(2002) argued that organizational procedures dictate the behavior of organizational members. 
Regulative forces have been associated with obtaining compliance with the field in which 
they are embedded and the pursuit of self-interest. North (1990) stresses the use of rules and 
enforcement mechanisms enabling this compliance. When these rules are violated, 
punishment is administered. Formal structures and procedures and organizational systems 
therefore prohibit and enable individual behavior. Incremental innovations seem to benefit 
from structures and procedures that are familiar to organizational members (Ettlie et al. 
1984). These innovations are typically consistent with the prevailing organizational 
archetypes (Greenwood and Hinings 1993), which suggests that developing and 
implementing them will be considered legitimate and should not be too problematic.  
 
Micro normative forces 
Normative forces introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social 
life, reflecting the values (what is preferred) and norms (how things should be done) of the 
social system (Scott 2001). People in specific organizational roles are expected to fulfill 
certain social obligations (March and Olsen 1989). In the Westray mine example, Wicks 
(2001) showed that the underground miners fulfilled at least two roles; organizational roles 
and non-work roles. In the organizational roles certain ideas about how to act as a miner were 
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stressed, whereas in non-work roles their families expected them to behave differently. 
Appropriate behavior reflects the normal way in which people do what they are supposed to 
do and is based on behavior that is expected and valued by other actors (March and Olsen 
1989: 21). These expectations are often perceived as external pressures to which one must 
conform. In the financial sector consistent performance at a high level and processing 
competency are highly valued. Raising uncertainties or increasing risks is not consistent with 
the ruling values and norms and is therefore most likely to be avoided. However, since 
incremental innovation is of an evolutionary nature, only a limited number of uncertainties 
are involved and firms are likely to engage in such innovation.  
 
Micro cultural-cognitive forces 
Cultural-cognitive forces include shared systems of meaning that arise in processes of 
interaction between organizational members (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Scott 2001). 
Eventually these systems are taken for granted by individual actors because humans tend to 
habitualize their actions. By repeating actions they become patterns that can be reproduced 
and transmitted to new entrants (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Zucker 1987). Shared systems 
of meaning can arise within groups, but may differ between groups within the same 
organization. Dougherty (1992) empirically demonstrated that groups with distinct identities 
based on professional disciplines respond differently to new product development efforts. 
This is largely the result of frames that individuals use to make sense of their environment. 
Information has to be consistent with these frames or it will be repressed or ignored (Garud 
and Rappa 1994). Kaplan (2003) argued that framing is a political and self-conscious process 
in which meaning is negotiated between groups of individuals. This means that the frame that 
appeals to one group within the organization may not appeal to another group that has a 
different system of meaning.  
 
Although Scott (2001: 51) argues that he refrains from an integrated conception of the three 
forces, he acknowledges that the forces can reinforce each other. A few empirical studies 
demonstrated that multiple institutional forces can simultaneously exert pressure on 
organizations (Ruef and Scott 1998; Hoffman 1999; D’Aunno et al. 2000; Wicks 2001). 
However, teasing apart the forces in practice is extremely difficult. The different forces are so 
interwoven with each other that it is almost impossible to describe any without reference to 
the others. However, we try to describe them separately. Figure 1 displays our model. 
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---Insert Figure 1 about here--- 
  
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The financial services sector in the Netherlands is an interesting research context for 
increasing our understanding of micro institutional forces in incumbent firms. It is a highly 
institutionalized sector that has been confronted with major changes that have challenged 
these firms to invest in new products (cf. Volberda et al. 2001). However, banks and 
insurance companies are not known for their innovativeness and many financial companies in 
the Netherlands struggle with incremental product innovation (Vermeulen 2005). A study by 
Volberda et al. (2001) showed that there are only a few outliers in terms of innovation in the 
financial services sector. We excluded these outliers in our sample. For most banks and 
insurance companies new products are only modifications of existing products that build on 
current competencies (Avlonitis et al. 2001). This type of innovation mainly concerns 
improvements in existing ‘combi-products’. Combi-products resemble architectural 
innovations (Henderson and Clark 1990). The separate component parts of these products 
already exist, yet either the combination is new or one of the components has changed which 
creates new linkages with other components. As such, they also resemble Garud and 
Nayyar’s (1994) notion of transformative capacity in which firms combine resources spread 
over the organization. In our case, we are interested in improved versions of these products. 
This means that the linkages between components remain unchanged and the core concepts 
are reinforced. These improved combi-products are labeled incremental innovations. The 
complexity of these innovations concerns the reorganization of interdependent administrative 
procedures and the co-ordination of the multiple departments involved (MacMillan et al. 
1985).  
 
Research methods 
We conducted an inductive study in the period 1997-2002 using multiple qualitative data 
collection methods. In total over 175 people were interviewed. All those interviewed, except 
one, agreed on the use of a tape recorder that was used in the writing of transcripts. These 
transcripts were sent back to the respondents in order to give them the opportunity for factual 
corrections. The final version of all transcripts and the documents based on meetings with the 
twelve case organizations covered more than 1400 pages of empirical material. Table 1 
provides an overview of the research phases and activities, displays the number of companies 
involved, the main goals, and the research instruments for the various activities. 
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 --- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
In the first phase of the empirical research in 1997, a panel of company experts was formed. 
Representatives from ten of the largest Dutch financial services companies, i.e. firms with 
more than 2500 employees like ABN-AMRO, AEGON, ING and Rabobank, participated in 
this group. Members of the group were actively involved in product innovation processes in 
their organization. Together with the members of the panel it was decided to study the 
development of the latest generation of combi-products. The panel considered these products 
as the most appropriate examples of incremental innovations. 
In the second phase an exploratory round of interviews was conducted in 39 firms 
including incumbent and non-incumbent companies. These companies were selected using 
criterion sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994). The sampling criterion used was to focus on 
companies that had recently introduced an improved combi-product. 42 companies were 
contacted by phone, of which eventually 39 agreed to cooperate. The interviews focused on 
the respondent’s understanding of product innovation processes and the surrounding forces 
affecting the development of new products. All the interviews followed a common protocol: 
people were first asked to elaborate on product development processes and subsequently 
generic questions were asked to find out more about the stages and the potential problems in 
these processes, and who was involved. The questions that were asked in this round were 
based on the existing NPD literature. We did not include the results from this first round in 
the paper since we have limited information on the projects. Hence, we only used this 
information as a first exploration. The results from the exploratory interviews in phase 2 did 
show that especially incumbent firms (the larger and older firms in the industry) experienced 
problems in complex incremental product innovation projects. Therefore, in the final stage of 
data collection (see below) we focused on the incumbents.  
In phase three and in addition to these exploratory interviews in 39 companies, ten 
interviews were conducted with IT experts in the ten companies from the panel group. This 
type of convenience sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994) saved time and effort in gaining 
access to firms. The reason for conducting these interviews was twofold. Firstly, the data 
from the exploratory interviews was rather one-sided, because only marketers or product 
developers were interviewed. Secondly, the results from the exploratory interviews indicated 
that information systems had a strong impact on the possibility of developing new products. 
This was verified in the panel. These interviews followed a similar protocol as mentioned 
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above. Furthermore, the IT experts were asked to provide a detailed description of the 
companies’ information systems. 
 In the fourth phase the panel group was again consulted. We wanted to make sure that 
not only did we think that our projects were examples of complex incremental innovations, 
but we also wanted to know the opinion of the experts in the field. This way we could 
strengthen our argument that we are really looking at complex incremental projects. 
 In the final phase of data collection, selected business units from twelve incumbent 
companies were studied. We selected respondents from two different but similar business 
units in each of these firms in which exemplary product development projects were studied. 
These could be either successful or unsuccessful projects (in terms of development). In our 
analysis we constantly compared these projects to understand why they developed differently. 
Since we tried to study intraorganizational institutional forces, we needed data on both firm 
level and project level. Furthermore, we wanted to make sure that the business units we 
selected were highly similar in terms of their strategic situation. We did not include, for 
instance, the damage insurance business units because these are in a different strategic 
situation (e.g. short time-frames of products). The selected companies were all founded more 
than 75 years ago, however, they differed in size (number of employees) and focus (global 
versus national). Our sample is equally divided into banks and insurance companies.  
 Two product development projects in separate business units were selected in each of 
the firms in close consultation with a business unit manager (see Table 2). Two selection 
criteria were used. The products had to be so-called improved combi-products, meaning that 
besides functional departments (such as actuaries, marketing, IT, and legal affairs) more than 
one product department was involved in the development process due to the multiple aspects 
of the product.  
 
--- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The second criterion was the development stage of the project. The development process had 
to be either finished within the last year or had to be in progress in order for the respondents 
to be able to recall the details about the development process. Three companies were not able 
to present two product development projects in distinct business units. In these firms we 
chose the two most recent incremental development efforts in one business unit and added 
these to our sample. The 125 interviews were conducted with people in different departments 
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and at various hierarchical levels in the organization. The same protocol mentioned was again 
used.  
 
Data Analysis 
The transcripts describe the experiences and opinions of the respondents regarding 
complex incremental product innovation projects. As such, they reflect specific 
characterizations of the respondents’ version of reality. These characterizations referred to the 
respondent’s opinion on why certain events and activities occurred. Several steps were taken 
in the analysis of the transcripts (see also Appendix 1). First, we engaged in a coding 
procedure (cf. Miles and Huberman 1994) in which labels were assigned to text units 
(sentences or paragraphs). These labels represented the key issues mentioned by the 
respondents. During this initial stage we mainly used descriptive codes for broad overview of 
key issues in the innovative efforts of banks and insurance companies. These codes entail 
little interpretation since they closely resemble the text of the transcripts; in our case 
descriptive codes like cooperation (COP), division of labor (DOL), sanctions (SAN), 
informal meetings (IME), formal meetings (FME), and coordination (COR) are examples of 
descriptive codes that were attributed to ‘organizational structure’.  
Second, we identified underlying patterns by grouping the initial codes into a smaller 
number of themes (cf. Miles and Huberman 1994), often referred to as axial coding. These 
patterns were first compared across interviews. An example of a pattern that appeared from 
our data is the so-called expectancy gap. While examining our data we discovered that the 
unsuccessful projects suffered from major differences between the managerial and employee 
level. CEOs and senior managers thought incremental innovation was crucial for the viability 
of their companies, whereas the employees considered it as a burden. Passages from the 
transcripts related to each of the patterns were highlighted. Next, we grouped passages 
relating to the same patterns. We were eventually able to identify several patterns that 
appeared to be dominant (we counted the appearance of all the patterns in the interviews) in 
either the regulatory, normative or cultural-cognitive perspective. 
Thus, we structured the data analysis process by using coding procedures allowing us 
to identify the most relevant issues in our data. We were able to construct two distinct 
templates that were used in the firms we studied. One of these was labeled the ‘business-as-
usual’ template and the other  ‘innovation’ template. The patterns from the axial coding stage 
and the further refinement into separate themes helped us in describing the features of the two 
templates. 
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 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This section discusses the empirical findings in line with the three types of forces as 
discussed above (regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive). We make a distinction 
between the successful and unsuccessful projects. The quotes used in the description of our 
research findings are exclusively related to specific projects. The quotes in Table 3, however, 
are used to illustrate the findings across multiple projects and resemble exemplary quotes that 
are associated with at least eight of the twelve unsuccessful or successful projects. 
 
---INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE--- 
 
Micro regulative forces 
Micro regulative forces are relatively easy to identify. These forces are highly influential in 
organizations due to their “power to set rules, monitor activity, and enforce compliance” 
(Wicks 2001). The case studies revealed that most financial companies tried to change their 
formal structure.  
 
Unsuccessful projects 
The organizations in our study demonstrated that new project based organizational structures 
did not function as they were supposed to at work floor level. Individual actions that were 
aimed at avoiding the old departmentalized structure were in some cases sanctioned. 
Exchanging information between departments was experienced as being difficult and at times 
undesirable. 
Formal rules and procedures dictate organizational behavior in many business units in 
the financial services sector. Although these rules are often meant to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness, they may also affect business units negatively. This was clearly the case in 
the unsuccessful projects in our study. Whereas employees in banks and insurance companies 
used to be appraised and rewarded for the number of policies processed, in the new structures 
this had not changed. Especially for smaller projects this has had its effects. Team members 
often hardly work on these projects because they fear that they will be sanctioned if the 
departments’ targets are not reached. The functional heads of departments were, therefore, 
unwilling to free some of their employees to work on new product development projects. As 
a result, incremental projects sometimes take up to 24 months to be completed (see also Table 
2).  
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 “Our organizational structure is set up to support innovation. However, this only applies to big 
projects. When smaller projects are involved the misery begins. Team members hardly work on 
these projects, because they will be sanctioned if they do not reach the targets for the 
department they normally work for. So, the functional team leaders are not really interested in 
letting people go to work on new product development and start harassing my project members 
about targets that should be reached. How are you supposed to run a project when this is 
constantly slowing the development process down?” (BanCo project leader). 
 
This clinging to formal rules and procedures had a strong inhibitive impact on the product 
development activities. In seven of the business units we were able to identify some kind of 
sanction mechanism used to keep in line with the standard procedures. 
 The existing information systems are also an important regulative force, which set 
hard boundaries for new products yet to be developed. Product developers in all twelve failed 
projects complained that the IT department often claimed that when some new product was 
being developed the adaptations needed in the system were not possible. This necessitated 
adjustments in the product concept. In all twelve cases, this meant that the product concept 
was less innovative than was originally intended and as such the information systems 
inhibited the development of new products. A complicating factor is that it is not possible for 
people outside the IT department to judge whether adjustments to the systems are possible. It 
was frequently mentioned that IT personnel were not really interested in product development 
and often claimed that something was not possible. Most new products are still IT driven or 
at least guided by the state of IT. Most of the time the product concept would be adjusted in 
line with IT possibilities, because it was considered impossible to change the information 
systems.  
 
Successful projects 
One of the key features of the successful projects is their separation from the regular 
organization, not leaving room for ‘outside’ interference. The bureaucratic influences from 
the organization were successfully kept away from these projects, meaning that the team 
members could concentrate on their project tasks without being bothered with routine day-
to-day activities. Several respondents claimed that the only way to avoid the excessive 
rules and procedures in their organizations was to isolate their projects. In these situations 
separate structures were designed to shelter the new product from the standing 
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organization. Furthermore, in the successful projects the team members were reluctant to 
use formal rules and procedures.  
 
“When I was transferred to the BU Pensions, I was immediately asked to forget all the 
procedures used in the rest of the organization. I knew this was a rather strange bunch of 
cowboys, but in the first development project I was involved in, I immediately understood what 
they were doing and why they were doing it. These guys almost made me swear not to look into 
any manual. They claimed that that would restrict our creative capabilities”  (PayCo Marketing 
Manager). 
 
Key to all the successful projects in our study was the idea of ‘letting go’. Several business 
unit managers claimed that every innovation project required a slightly different approach. 
They stressed, however, the importance of creativity and freedom to maneuver as the key to 
success.  
 
Micro normative forces 
Normative aspects of institutions are often found in notions of appropriate behavior (March 
and Olson 1989). The emphasis of normative forces is on “prescriptive, evaluative and 
obligatory dimensions” of social life (Scott 2001: 54).  
 
Unsuccessful projects 
The business unit managers in our study closely monitored the activities at the initiation 
stage, not allowing for much creativity. There is a clear attitude of risk avoidance 
displayed in the business units we studied. Many of our respondents claimed that 
managers constantly think they should reduce any risk involved with innovative projects. 
This kind of risk avoiding behavior is reflected in much of the innovative activities of the 
firms in our study and is closely related to the formal rules and procedures. In the product 
development manuals, for instance, the type of initial scans needed before a decision is 
taken to actually develop a new product are clearly described. The actual amount of pages 
related to these initial stages, before a go/no-go, is often twice the number of pages spent 
on the execution and implementation. Besides that, the formal rules and procedures 
(including the manuals) are often used as straightjackets that inhibit innovative behavior, 
also leading to expectations of appropriate behavior. This was explained by a HypCo 
product manager: 
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 “Cooperating with other team members was really difficult. The tasks were strictly divided and 
no one seemed to be interested in each other’s task. I tried to get some of the other members 
more involved with my tasks, but they just rejected any attempt at closer cooperation. I just 
didn’t understand why this was the case, but some of the colleagues in my department told me 
that it was just not done to have these informal talks in this organization. The project’s weekly 
meeting was the place to discuss these things.” 
 
The results from our case studies also showed that there is a gap between the expectations 
from management regarding the necessity of incremental product innovation and the 
perception of these expectations of the employees. This frequently meant that employees 
did not understand that innovation was highly valued, or at least claimed to be highly 
valued, by top management. Business unit managers and ‘shop-floor’ employees were not 
only hardly interested in new products, but also did not see these activities to be very 
relevant for their organization. Furthermore, they were sometimes sanctioned for not 
reaching operational targets (for instance in terms of policies processed) and as a result did 
not value innovation.  
This is closely related to the lack of (social) obligation to incremental product 
innovation. The project leaders particularly experienced this. They claimed that many 
projects are completed in a very different team composition compared with the ‘starting line-
up’. Apparently, somewhere during the development process priorities shift to projects 
related to the daily activities and team members are reallocated by their superiors who feel no 
obligation to finish projects team members were originally assigned to. Due to the high 
frequency with which this happens, the project leaders feel as if their projects are of little 
relevance. There was hardly any obligation from team members to finish their project 
activities. Their team leaders often did not expect them to spend too much time on product 
development.  
 
Successful projects 
In the BU’s with successful projects we identified a different set of normative forces, in 
particular ruling norms and values related to risk and mutual expectations, clearly directed to 
enabling incremental innovation. What was most striking in the interviews with respondents 
from these BU’s was the absence of ‘risk’ in their stories. Only when asked they talked about 
potential risks of innovation. They merely considered risk to be an essential part of every 
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innovation project, incremental or radical, but did not bother too much with avoiding it. One 
BU manager from CreditCo claimed: 
 
“We borrowed Nike’s slogan; Just do it. This is how it works. If you start wondering or 
recalculating everything too long there will be no new products launched or you launch them 
too late. This is even worse than an occasional failure. I know we are about the only ones in this 
company who do it like this, but it really works for us. And as long as they (referring to top 
management) let us, why should I start worrying about possible problems. We do our 
homework, but do not drown in it”. 
 
This quote illustrates the main differences in the perception and way of handling risk between 
successful and unsuccessful projects. Whereas the unsuccessful projects spend the majority of 
their time on avoiding any potential risk, the successful projects are much faster on deciding 
whether or not to develop the new product. As a result, the development times were much 
shorter in these latter projects. Remarkably, this way of thinking is reinforced by the way 
these BU’s deal with formal rules and procedures. In the previous section it was explained 
that ‘letting go’ was considered essential for innovation. The idea of ‘just do it’ seems to be 
closely related to the rejection of using development manuals and other organizational 
procedures. 
The expectancy gap between top management and business unit, as it appeared in the 
unsuccessful projects, did not appear in the successful projects. The expectations from top 
management were aligned with the actual behavior in the successful projects. Again, this 
speeded up the development process and led to less iteration. Most of the team members were 
fully devoted to the innovative projects they were working on and some considered it to be an 
honor. The alignment of expectations has been a key success factor in these business units. 
 
Micro Cultural-Cognitive forces  
The cultural-cognitive emphasis of institutions resembles “shared conceptions that constitute 
the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning is made” (Scott 2001: 57). 
In this study micro cultural-cognitive forces are shared conceptions and frames of reference 
belonging to distinct professional identities. Furthermore, we discovered that the successful 
projects were framed (cf. Kaplan 2003) differently when compared with their less successful 
counterparts. 
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Unsuccessful projects 
The various professional disciplines involved in innovation processes have developed 
different systems of meaning over time. The departments in the case companies seemed to 
have their own way of working (accompanied by specific jargon or language and even dress 
codes), and their own vision of the path their business unit and organization should follow. 
The specialists from different disciplines did not speak the same language and created little 
understanding for each other’s activities. Project team members represented their functional 
department. This led to difficulties in creating a common understanding of the aims, 
properties, and process-requirements of incremental innovations. It often involved aspects 
such as different languages and visions resulting in lower levels of cooperation in the project 
teams. Most of these problems manifested themselves on the interface between marketing 
and information technology departments and (in case of insurance products) between 
actuaries and the other team members. This kind of behavior has developed over the years 
and is an illustration of the existence of distinct systems of shared meanings. Eventually the 
most dominant disciplines decided what happened. In the unsuccessful projects these were 
often actors from the actuarial, legal and IT departments. These departments had a limited 
interest in exploring new opportunities, and instead focus on exploiting the companies’ 
existing practices. 
 
“Basically what happens is that we come up with an interesting new idea. Management initially 
approves of the idea and commits to the project. However, typically when the idea is further 
described in a product concept, all sorts of adjustments need to be made because the idea is too 
far-fetched and does not fit our current systems or whatever. It happens with almost every 
improved combi-product. There are too many powerful people in certain parts of this 
organization that are just not fond of all these new ideas. In the end they decide what happens” 
(BanCo product manager). 
 
Successful projects 
The successful projects in our sample show that different meaning systems do not necessarily 
have to lead to conflict situations. In four of the successful projects, project leaders focused 
on team building and creating a shared understanding before the team actually started 
working on the project. A special kick-off session was organized in which the team members 
quickly discovered that they could cooperate together despite their differences. These projects 
were given the opportunity (in terms of funding and top management support) to actually 
 16
invest in team building. Instead of these project teams being dominated by different 
identities, they converged into groups with a shared identity.  
 
“What we actually do is more or less pretend that these projects are major breakthrough 
innovations. We set up the entire organization, as was it a radical project. We separate it from 
the regular organization, away from all the rules and procedures, because otherwise our daily 
operations will interfere. We have people who are almost fully dedicated (in time) to the project 
and they all work in the same room. Only if we set it up like this the rest of the organization 
realizes that this is important for the entire organization, which creates a better position for the 
project when it needs to be implemented” (SureCo BU manager).  
 
In eight of the successful projects we were able to identify similar attempts of ‘framing’ 
incremental innovation projects as radical innovation projects2. For many business units this 
seemed to be the most effective way of managing incremental projects. Some of the BU 
managers claimed that increasing the importance of their projects for the whole organization 
gave them a better bargaining position for resources. This very much relates to the notion of 
framing contests (Kaplan 2003) in which negotiation is a political game to be played with 
powerful players. Framing projects more radically provides a jumpstart in these negotiations. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The innovation literature emphasizes that incremental innovations do not differentiate 
much from existing product portfolios and therefore routine procedures and capabilities are 
sufficient to initiate this type of innovation. However, many incumbent firms still struggle 
with incremental product innovation efforts despite the numerous studies suggesting solutions 
to overcome potential barriers. Occasionally they are capable of successfully developing 
incremental innovations, which means that the innovation is developed and launched onto the 
market rapidly and smoothly. The main reason for this variation in success does not only 
come from better organizing projects or more sophisticated use of the available tools to 
develop new products, as has often been suggested by the new product development literature 
(e.g. Cooper 1999; Kahn 2004). We have argued that intraorganizational institutional forces 
have a strong impact on the innovative efforts of incumbent firms (cf. Elsbach 2002). 
In our study of the development and implementation of complex incremental product 
innovation projects we have provided evidence that micro institutional forces impact strongly 
                                                          
2 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing out the notion of framing. 
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on these projects. Their persistence over time is largely due to the fact that they have become 
institutionalized and have led to the development of distinct organizational templates (cf. 
Greenwood and Hinings 1993). As such, we believe that an institutional perspective has the 
potential to complement the existing innovation literature in uncovering some of the 
underlying reasons for the (lack of) innovative behavior of certain parts of an organization.  
The regulatory forces, for instance, primarily deal with facilitating or obstructing 
exchanges among members of an organization (cf. Zucker 1988). This not only refers to the 
organizational rules and standard operating procedures, but also to the IT systems. For any 
innovation project in which multiple departments are involved facilitating exchanges between 
representatives from these departments is crucial. However, internal structures exhibit “the 
social permanence of institutions”. When the degree of internal institutionalization in 
incumbent firms increases over time, similarity with other organizations, including the degree 
of codification and interdependence, will make it for incumbent firms more difficult to 
change these structures (Zucker 1988:35). The unsuccessful projects in our study clearly 
suffered from these regulatory institutional forces. In the successful projects we also were 
able to identify some kind of regulatory forces. These were, however, very much directed 
towards enhancing creativity. The rules that guide the actions of individuals in these projects 
were mostly informal, were clearly communicated and deviations were hardly accepted.  
The micro normative forces in our study also affected incremental innovation. 
Managers in the unsuccessful projects displayed a strong risk-avoiding attitude on the one 
hand, whereas on the other hand they hardly felt any obligation towards completing projects 
on time. The internalization of this kind of behavior generates expectations that guide the 
actions of other organizational members (Scott 2001). In our case this meant that not only 
managers, but also team members lacked social obligation. Furthermore, there were clear 
distinctions regarding the perceptions on the need for incremental innovation between various 
actors in the organizations studied; different perceptions of top managers, business unit 
managers and lower level managers and employees directly involved in executing 
incremental product innovation projects in particular contributed negatively to the success of 
these projects. The unsuccessful projects in our study seem to be lacking institutional 
concurrence (Dougherty and Cohen 1995), which indicates that there is no alignment 
between what top management is thinking and doing and what employees are thinking and 
doing. In the business units that successfully managed to develop incremental innovations, 
we found a different institutional logic (cf. Friedland and Alford 1991). Not only were the 
expectations clear and consistent in various layers of the organization, the perception of risk 
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was quite different. Risk was valued as being ‘part of the game’ and could not be reduced 
completely. 
Cultural-cognitive forces include different systems of meaning and dominant 
identities. When powerful actors in the organizations were opposed to innovation (cf. 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996), hardly any resources were made available. The shared 
systems of meaning are negotiated over time in interaction processes between organizational 
actors (Scott 2001). The more time individuals spend interacting with identity-like 
individuals, the stronger the degree of segmentation in an organization (cf. Trice 1993). 
Again, we found strong differences between the successful and unsuccessful cases. The 
successful projects were almost all framed as radical projects in order to obtain and maintain 
the necessary resources and to be able to escape from the rules and procedures of the standing 
organization.  
Two distinct templates were found in the firms in our study. Although there were 
differences between the templates used in these firms, the templates shared many attributes. 
Here we focus only on the commonalities. The unsuccessful projects were all dominated by a 
‘business as usual’ template. The projects were all managed by a strict adherence to 
prevailing rules and procedures, risk avoidance was highly valued and the dominant powerful 
departments clearly supported this way of dealing with incremental innovation projects which 
were taken for granted. The successful projects displayed an ‘innovation’ template in which 
the rules and standard procedures were discarded, projects were isolated from the 
organization, risks were valued as being part of the innovation game and projects were 
framed in line with more breakthrough innovations. Our ‘innovation’ template deviates from 
many studies that suggest that new ideas must be framed in line with the status quo, 
disguising their radical nature, in order to obtain legitimacy (e.g. Aldrich and Fiol 1994; 
Hargadon and Douglas 2001). Although the true nature of these innovative attempts can be 
labeled ‘mindful deviations’ (Garud and Karnøe 2001), they were framed in a more deviant 
way. However, as Garud and Karnøe (2001) argued this degree of deviance should not be too 
large for this will generate illegitimacy. It is not likely that all projects within a firm can be 
managed as breakthrough innovations, most firms will lack the resources to do so. The 
concept of mindful deviations is, however, an intriguing concept that may allow firms to be 
more successful with incremental innovations. 
It was mentioned earlier that a few empirical studies demonstrated that multiple 
institutional forces can simultaneously exert pressures on organizations (Ruef and Scott 1998; 
Hoffman 1999; D’Aunno et al. 2000; Scott et al. 2000; Wicks 2001). Although we tried to 
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describe the forces separately from each other, the forces are clearly interwoven. The 
interaction between micro-institutional forces further enforces their impact on the two 
templates we identified. Our data also provided empirical evidence for the existence of 
interactions between various forces that reinforced their impact. The regulatory forces in our 
study clearly interacted with normative forces. The rules and procedures that drive 
organizational behavior seem to interact with the perceived expectations of employees 
regarding the core activities of their organizations. If employees are sanctioned for not 
reaching set targets (e.g. number of policies processed), while simultaneously not being 
rewarded for efforts in new product development projects, they may experience a lack of 
legitimacy for incremental product innovation. This way of working becomes normatively 
valued over time and then taken for granted. Furthermore, the business units that embraced 
incremental innovation created an atmosphere of ‘letting go’ of the formal rules and 
procedures, which simultaneously led to a ‘just do it’ mentality. The prevailing idea in these 
units was that incremental innovation always carries a certain amount of risk, but that should 
not stop or delay the development process. The latter normative force (risk avoidance) closely 
interacted with the meaning systems of different professional disciplines (micro cultural-
cognitive), which in turn interacted with the regulatory forces. A final example of interaction 
was the framing of incremental projects as if they were ‘radical’ projects. These projects were 
separated from the regular organization and managed to escape the formal rules and 
procedures. The institutional logic in the business units that framed their projects in more 
‘radical’ terms clearly differed from the more traditional business units in our study. Thus, in 
this research context we found indications that micro-institutional forces do not compete with 
each other, but instead are complementary and reinforce each other in favor of either of the 
two templates.  
 
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION 
As with most studies, our study also has limitations. We only studied one specific 
sector, the financial services sector, in one country. Additionally, there may be differences 
between countries regarding the macro institutional forces and their impact on micro 
institutional forces that may affect the outcomes of our study. Finally, we studied a specific 
type of innovation; incremental product innovation. Radical innovations may follow a 
completely different trajectory and may be more legitimate, so the impact of micro 
institutional forces may be limited. More research on these issues is needed. 
 20
These limitations suggest at least two directions for future research. Firstly, empirical 
research is needed in both other industries and in the financial services sector of other (EU) 
countries (Flier et al., 2003) to investigate the value of our framework. It has been argued in 
the innovation literature that innovation differs across industries and countries. The financial 
services industry is highly regulated, which makes it extremely interesting to study other 
highly regulated industries such as utilities, public school systems, childcare and airlines. In 
some countries, innovation may in itself prove to be more legitimate as the national 
government provides an environment that is conducive to innovation (Afuah 1998).  
Secondly, the findings also suggest that special attention is needed for the interaction 
dynamics between regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive forces. As was argued above, 
institutional research has not often focused on this interaction. Further research is needed to 
uncover the dynamics of interaction to fully understand (a) which institutional forces interact, 
(b) how these forces exactly interact, and (c) how the interaction of forces affects the 
legitimacy of innovation.  
In this paper we set out to investigate the determinants of successful incremental 
product innovations. The innovation literature has identified several important issues that 
affect the success or failure of incremental innovation. We argued that these valuable 
contributions have not addressed some of the underlying reasons for the problematic nature 
of incremental innovation. By using an institutional perspective we have been able to add 
another important determinant for the success of the development and implementation of 
incremental product innovation. We identified micro institutional forces that affect 
incremental product innovation and, as such, contribute to the persistence of innovation 
problems as identified in the literature. Scholars studying incremental product innovation 
could take these forces into account in their attempts to generate alternative strategies to 
successfully develop and implement incremental product innovations. We also expand the 
innovation literature by explicitly focusing on a service environment, whereas most of this 
literature still builds on manufacturing or high-tech industries. Moving into other empirical 
fields may also increase our understanding of the identified problems and could lead to the 
generation of valuable new ideas to solve these problems. Our suggestion to both 
practitioners and academics is not to solely focus on the traditional determinants that should 
lead to success, but to also take into account a variety of micro institutional forces from 
different empirical settings that may be responsible for the struggle regarding incremental 
product innovation. This will increase the chances for solving the persistence of these 
problems. 
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Figure 1 
Micro institutional forces and complex incremental product innovation 
 
Development and 
implementation of 
complex incremental 
product innovation 
Micro institutional forces
 Organizational structure
 Rules and procedures
 Organizational systems
Regulative
Normative
Cultural-cognitive
 Social obligation
 Ruling values and norms
 Expectations
 Shared meaning systems
 Dominant identities
 Framing
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Table 1 
An overview of the empirical research activities (1997-2002) 
 
Research 
phase 
Research 
Activity 
Companies 
involved 
Goals Research instruments 
Phase 1 Panel sessions 10 To get acquainted with the sector and 
financial services 
4 Panel sessions with 6-10 
people 
Phase 2 Exploratory 
interviews 
39 To obtain preliminary insights in product 
innovation process and forces affecting 
the process 
39 interviews (tape recorder 
used for transcripts) 
Phase 3 Interviews with 
IT experts 
10 To explore IT related forces 10 interviews (tape recorder 
used for transcripts) 
Phase 4 Panel sessions 10 To discuss results of stages 2 and 3 and 
select cases 
2 Panel sessions with 6-10 
people 
Phase 5 Case studies 12 To obtain in-depth insight of institutional 
forces affecting product innovation 
processes 
125 interviews (5 CEOs, 12 BU 
managers, 5 IT managers, 12 
Product Managers, 24 Project 
leaders, 24 IT project members, 
45 team members), 
observations, internal 
documents (tape recorder used 
for transcripts) 
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Table 2 
Extended Profile of projects 
          
Project 
 
Features of Product Innovation* Development 
time in 
months 
Number of 
departments 
involved 
Unsuccessful 
projects 
   
BanCo 1 Improved combi-product; new version of an existing mortgage product with 
existing linkages 
> 24 8 
FinCo 1 Improved combi-product; investment annuity of which several existed in the 
company, this product had several new investment features 
> 24 7 
SureCo 1 Improved combi-product; single-premium policy with investment 
opportunities. Similar products already present in the company 
12 < 24 6 
RealCo 1 Improved combi-product; investment annuity of which several existed in the 
company, this product had several new investment features related to pensions 
12 < 24 7 
PayCo 1 Improved combi-product; extension of already existing flexible life insurance 
product 
6 < 12 6 
RiskCo 1 Improved combi-product; mortgage product with extra features. Consumers 
can choose between saving and investing. Similar linkages between products 
already exist. 
6 < 12 5 
CashCo 1 Improved combi-product; mortgage product with extra features. Consumers 
can choose between saving and investing. Similar linkages between products 
already exist. 
12 < 24 7 
LifeCo 1 Improved combi-product; extension of already existing flexible life insurance 
product 
6 < 12 6 
HypCo 1 Improved combi-product; mortgage product for capital accumulation. New 
version of existing product with several adjustments. 
6 < 12 6 
CreditCo 1 Product improvement; minor extension of original mortgage product 1 < 6 3 
AssurCo 1 Improved combi-product; mortgage product with extra features. Consumers 
can choose between saving and investing. Similar linkages between products 
already exist. 
6 < 12 6 
ChipCo 1 Improved combi-product; investment annuity of which several existed in the 
company, this product had several new investment features 
6 < 12 4 
Successful 
projects 
   
BanCo 2 Improved combi-product; extension of original investment product with 
savings account 
1 < 6 4 
FinCo 2 Product improvement; minor extension of original mortgage product 6 < 12 7 
SureCo 2 Improved combi-product; mortgage product with extra features. Consumers 
can choose between saving and investing. Similar linkages between products 
already exist. 
6 < 12 7 
RealCo 2 Improved combi-product; new version of investment and savings product. 
Product is revised every two years. 
6 < 12 6 
PayCo 2 Improved combi-product; extension of original savings product combined with 
pension product 
1 < 6 4 
RiskCo 2 Product improvement; minor extension of original investment product 1 < 6 4 
CashCo 2 Improved combi-product; mortgage product for capital accumulation. New 
version of existing product with several adjustments. 
6 < 12 6 
LifeCo 2 Product improvement; minor extension of original life insurance product 1 < 6 3 
HypCo 2 Improved combi-product; flexible mortgage product with many options for 
consumers to choose from. Improved and extended version of an already 
existing flexible mortgage product. 
6 < 12 6 
CreditCo 2 Improved combi-product; new version of investment and savings product. 1 < 6 5 
AssurCo 2 Product improvement; minor extension of original pension product 1 < 6 4 
ChipCo 2 Improved combi-product; life insurance product with additional features, 
closely linked with investment product  
1 < 6 4 
* Combi-products are improved combinations of already existing products, product improvements are minor 
adjustments to an existing combi-product.  
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Table 3 
Exemplary quotes regarding micro institutional forces 
 
Exemplary 
Quotes 
 
Unsuccessful projects Successful projects 
Micro 
regulatory 
forces 
“We have a set of clear procedures and guidelines 
we need to use to develop new products. I always 
make sure that my project leaders follow this 
procedure. If not, they have a serious problem”.  
“We need to isolate these projects from the 
rest of the organization. Otherwise there 
will be too much formal rules that we need 
to comply with. We first design something 
really good, and then fit it in the system, not 
the other way around”. 
Micro 
normative 
forces 
“I know that there are some board members that 
want us to develop more new products, but luckily 
most of the people down here do not bother too 
much with these ideas. We don’t have time to 
work on innovation”. 
“Our main strength is that everybody shares 
the same expectations. We all know where 
we are going and why. From the CEO to 
people in the administrative departments, 
we know what to expect from each other. 
As long as nobody deviates from that path 
there is no problem”. 
Micro 
cultural-
cognitive 
forces 
“There were four key departments concerned with 
this product; marketing, product management, 
actuary and IT. I had the feeling that they did not 
speak each other’s language at all. This was one 
of the reasons for our problems. The activities of 
these departments have, of course, hardly been 
integrated into our organization. They operated 
mostly in isolation. This (cooperating with other 
departments) was therefore more or less new to 
them”. 
“If you look at who is actually in the lead 
here…it’s us! We are the creative people in 
this organization and we make the rules of 
the innovation game. Not the bureaucrats 
from IT or the legal departments that try to 
block every new idea. Although they often 
succeed, it will not happen here. Our boss 
does not allow that to happen. We are in 
charge of these projects”. 
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Appendix 1 
Coding procedures 
 
Steps Coding activities 
Step 1 Open coding of interviews to identify variety of intraorganizational institutional forces (examples 
provided in the main text) 
 
 
Axial coding for each of the intraorganizational institutional forces and see if types fit the entire 
data set: 
• Compare within cases and across cases to ascertain intraorganizational institutional 
forces 
• Sort the various issues into one of the three intraorganizational forces 
 
 
                  
                           What intraorganizational institutional forces is the issue related to? 
 
 
 
Regulative                                          Normative                                        Cultural-cognitive 
 
Step 2 
Letting go or strict adherence 
to rules and procedures, 
isolated from or embedded in 
organization, information 
systems that control type of 
innovation 
Employees feel obligated to 
fulfill their roles, ruling values 
and norms towards risks and 
clarity of expectations 
between top and employees 
Employees share similar 
belief systems or 
fundamentally differ in their 
beliefs, some identities are 
powerful and have strong 
impact on innovation, explicit 
framing of some projects 
Step 3 Based on step 1 and 2 distinguishing and describing of the two templates 
 
‘Business as usual’ template: projects managed by strict adherence to prevailing rules and 
procedures, risk avoidance highly valued and dominant departments supported this way of 
dealing with incremental innovation projects which had become taken for granted. 
 
‘Innovation’ template: the rules and standard procedures were discarded, projects were isolated 
from the organization, risks were valued as being part of the innovation game and projects were 
framed in line with more breakthrough innovations. 
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